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Despite extraordinary global progress in increasing coverage of antiretroviral
treatment (ART), the majority of people needing ART currently are not receiving
treatment. Both the number of people needing ART and the average ART price
per patient-year are expected to increase in coming years, which will dramat-
ically raise funding needs for ART. Several international organizations are using
interventions in ART markets to decrease ART price or to improve ART quality,
delivery and innovation, with the ultimate goal of improving population health.
These organizations need to select those market interventions that are most
likely to substantially affect population health outcomes (ex ante assessment)
and to evaluate whether implemented interventions have improved health
outcomes (ex post assessment).
We develop a framework to structure ex ante and ex post assessment of the
population health impact of market interventions, which is transmitted through
effects in markets and health systems. Ex ante assessment should include
evaluation of the safety and efficacy of the ART products whose markets will be
affected by the intervention; theoretical consideration of the mechanisms
through which the intervention will affect population health; and predictive
modelling to estimate the potential population health impact of the intervention.
For ex post assessment, analysts need to consider which outcomes to estimate
empirically and which to model based on empirical findings and understanding
of the economic and biological mechanisms along the causal pathway from
market intervention to population health. We discuss methods for ex post
assessment and analyse assessment issues (unintended intervention effects,
interaction effects between different interventions, and assessment impartiality
and cost). We offer seven recommendations for ex ante and ex post assessment of
population health impact of market interventions.
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KEY MESSAGES
 We present a framework to structure the assessment of population health impact of antiretroviral treatment market
interventions, both for funding decisions and for empirical evaluation of impact.
 Market interventions achieve population health impact through effects on markets (e.g. on product quantity or quality,
speed of delivery, or research investment) and health systems (e.g. coverage, efficacy, effectiveness, or scope of
treatment).
 We describe assessment methods and their limitations and seven practical recommendations are made for assessment of
population health impact of market interventions.
Introduction
In the 2010 report Towards Universal Access, the World Health
Organization (WHO) notes a remarkable worldwide increase in
the number of people receiving antiretroviral treatment (ART),
from an estimated 700 000 in 2004 to more than 5 million in
2009 (WHO/UNICEF/UNAIDS 2010). Despite this extraordinary
progress, about two-thirds of people, who according to the 2010
WHO guidelines needed ART in 2009, did not receive it (WHO/
UNICEF/UNAIDS 2010). Moreover, the total number of people
needing ART is expected to increase substantially in coming
years, both because current ART is effective in decreasing
mortality in HIV-infected individuals (Herbst et al. 2009;
Ba¨rnighausen et al. 2010) and because the new WHO ART
guidelines recommend ART initiation at an earlier HIV disease
stage (WHO 2010). Finally, for first-line ART the new WHO
guidelines recommend antiretroviral drug combinations with
more expensive drugs than the previously recommended
combinations (WHO 2010), implying higher treatment costs
per patient-year. For these reasons, the future financing
required to achieve universal coverage will be vast and is
unlikely to be met. Even at the current level of ART need,
available funding falls far short of funding need. UNAIDS
estimated a gap of US$6.5 billion between the funding
‘available for AIDS from all sources’ and the ‘UNAIDS estimate
of resources needed’ in 2008 (Kates et al. 2009), and the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria predicts that its
future funding will ‘fall short of the estimated resources needed
to meet demand from developing countries seeking to further
scale up their disease programs’ (The Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 2010). It is thus important to
consider how limited financial resources for ART can be used
most efficiently.
In service provision, changes in the structure of ART
programmes (Ba¨rnighausen 2007), task shifting (Lehmann
et al. 2009; Shumbusho et al. 2009; Zachariah et al. 2009;
Ba¨rnighausen et al. 2010), and technology changes can improve
efficiency. In the supply of products required for treatment,
market interventions can increase the quantity, quality, reli-
ability, delivery, or rate of innovation of ART products, and thus
affect the efficiency of resource use. Examples of ART market
interventions include:
 Financial incentives to improve investment in the develop-
ment of ART-related products (such as advance market
commitments, priority review vouchers, or innovation in-
ducement prices);
 Product prequalification by international organizations to
ensure donor funds are used to purchase quality medicines
in an accelerated time frame;
 Patent pools, which allow more efficient licensing of
patented antiretroviral medicines (ARV) for generic produc-
tion in return for royalty payments;
 Equitable access licensing, i.e. licenses for new ARV allowing
generic manufacturers to produce the licensed products for
markets in developing countries, thus reducing the ARV
prices in these markets;
 Purchasing of ART products from multiple producers to keep
markets competitive;
 Pooling of orders to increase the efficiency of price negoti-
ations and balance negotiation power on the demand and
supply sides;
 Third-party price negotiation;
 Technology transfers to develop and produce medicines;
 Training of Ministry of Health (MoH) staff and ART
programme managers in supply chain management to
ensure uninterrupted availability of ARV in all treatment
sites and to increase the efficiency of ARV supply chains.
These market interventions are described in a number of
publications (Herrling 2008; Hecht et al. 2009a; Waning et al.
2009; GHT Coalation 2010; Noehrenberg 2010; Waning et al.
2010a; Waning et al. 2010b). While the intended direct effect of
most market interventions is to increase the value of ARV
products that can be obtained for a given budget, most
organizations that have used, or plan to use, market interven-
tions—including UNITAID, the Clinton Health Access Initiative
(CHAI), the United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR), and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis (TB) and Malaria—ultimately aim to improve
population health in the developing world. These organizations
are increasingly asked to produce evidence that their actions
improve not only market conditions but also population health
(Feachem and Sabot 2006; Feachem and Sabot 2007). The
organizations thus face the following two tasks: first, to select
those market interventions proposed for funding that are most
likely to substantially affect population health and, second, to
evaluate whether implemented interventions have led to popu-
lation health improvements. The first task demands assessment
before a market intervention has been implemented, while the
second calls for assessment after intervention implementation.
In the following, we refer to assessment before intervention
implementation as ex ante assessment and assessment after
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implementation as ex post assessment. The distinction between
the data and analytic requirements for these two different types
of assessment has not always been recognized.
Below, we first describe a framework that can be used to
analyse the pathways from market interventions to population
health. We then consider the content of ex ante assessment,
describe different approaches to ex post assessment, and discuss
five issues in the assessment of market interventions (unin-
tended effects, interaction effects, and the time horizon,
impartiality and costs of assessment). Finally, we offer seven
recommendations for the evaluation of population health
impact of market interventions.
The pathways from market interventions to population health
outcomes can be divided into three steps (Figure 1). First, an
ART market intervention should have market effects. Intended
market effects include ARV price reduction, product quality
improvement and assurance, improved product delivery, and
advances in innovation. Second, these market effects can entail
health system effects, such as increased coverage of the
population needing ART, improved ART efficacy or effective-
ness, or expanded scope of treatable diseases and conditions
that ART patients suffer from. Finally, health systems effects
can translate into changes in the morbidity and mortality of
populations needing HIV care and ART. Distinguishing between
these three steps is useful in identifying the pathways through
which market interventions can affect population health and in
assessing how to quantify population health impact.
Ex ante assessment
For organizations aiming to improve population health through
market interventions, it is essential to compare estimates of
potential health impact in selecting proposals for funding. Of
course, in such ex ante assessments effects cannot be measured,
since the intervention has yet to take place. However, three
types of assessment are possible at this stage. First, a
due-diligence evaluation of the safety and efficacy of existing
products can be undertaken to ensure that a market interven-
tion does not harm patients and, at least in optimal circum-
stances, will improve the health of individual patients. In most
cases, safety and efficacy assessment can be based on the
results of published randomized controlled trials and national
market approvals.
Second, the precise mechanisms through which a project is
thought to affect population health can be described qualita-
tively, using existing evidence to support each step of the
hypothesized pathways (using, for instance, the structure
proposed in Figure 1). Such a description will serve to establish
the plausibility of the population health impact related to a
particular market intervention. Estimates of market effect
should be conducted in a manner consistent with economic
theory, such as theories of optimal procurement (Naegelen
2002; Chen et al. 2005) or oligopolistic competition (Vives
1999). For example, an intervention that decreases the price of
an ART product should be expected to increase the quantity of
the product sold. Estimates of impact on population health, on
the other hand, should be in agreement with biological theory
and clinical evidence. For example, increases in ART adherence
should improve treatment effectiveness and reduce HIV-related
morbidity and mortality.
Third, the quantitative market effects, health system effects
and population health impact can be predicted in modelling
exercises, using assumptions about the size of the effect of
market interventions on markets, health systems, and morbid-
ity and mortality, based on the empirical literature or expert
opinion. For instance, structural equation models have been
used to estimate the market effects of patent protection
(Chaudhuri et al. 2006). Past models of the impact of HIV
interventions on population health outcomes have included
models that are calibrated using one parameter (Granich et al.
2009; Hecht et al. 2009a) or multiple parameters (Stover et al.
2007; Lima et al. 2008), as well as system dynamics models that
reflect the underlying mechanisms of the interventions
(Ba¨rnighausen et al. 2007; Ba¨rnighausen and Bloom 2009). In
some circumstances, such extensive modelling exercises may be
possible to forecast intervention health impacts; however, in
many other situations, quantitative predictions of health impact
may be based on less resource-intense modelling, such as
simple translations of expected market results into health
outcomes using published estimates of treatment effectiveness.
Ex post assessment
In contrast to ex ante assessment, ex post assessment can, at least
in principle, be based on observed outcomes, allowing evalu-
ation of intervention effect and impact. The difficulty in
measuring outcomes and attributing them to particular
market interventions will commonly increase from left to
right along the pathway shown in Figure 1. One reason for
this progression is that the effect of other factors on outcomes
is likely to increase along the pathway. For instance, education,
Market intervention Market effects Health system effects Population health impact
• Quantity
• Quality
• Delivery
• Investment
• Coverage
• Treatment efficacy
• Treatment effectiveness
• Scope of treatment
• Morbidity
• Mortality
• Quality of life
Economic plausibility Biological plausibility
Figure 1 Pathways from market interventions to population health impact
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nutrition and the physical environment are likely to be
important determinants of population health, such as morbidity
and mortality in people needing ART, in addition to the level of
treatment coverage. The same factors, however, are unlikely to
produce market effects, such as the quality of an ART product.
We would expect that it will be more difficult to adequately
control for the effect of confounding factors on health systems
and health, and hence to attribute these outcomes to market
interventions, than to control for the influence of confound-
ing factors on markets. Moreover, the length of lag times
between market intervention and outcomes increases along
the pathway. While a market intervention may lead to increased
coverage with certain ARV within weeks, the impact of this
health system effect on population health may not be observable
for several months (e.g. mortality declines in people needing
ART) or years (e.g. changes in the rate of development of
drug-resistant virus). Hence, it will be more difficult to control
for secular changes in the evaluation of intervention effects
on population health than on markets or health systems.
Finally, the difficulty of measuring results increases along the
pathway. Short-run market effects, such as prices and quantity,
can commonly be observed with good accuracy in existing central
databases (Waning et al. 2009). In contrast, health outcomes,
such as cause-specific mortality, are rarely measured accurately
in developing countries. For instance, in most countries in
sub-Saharan Africa vital registration systems record only small
proportions of all deaths (Mathers et al. 2005) and, among the
recorded deaths, commonly misreport the causes (Groenewald
et al. 2005). Similarly, information on ART regimens used,
retention in care and adherence are difficult to obtain.
For ex post assessment of population health impact, it may
thus be substantially easier to measure market or health system
effects rather than population health impact. To assess health
impact, when only market or health system effects are
observed, a translation step is required to predict changes in
health outcomes from changes in factors closer to the inter-
vention along the causal pathway to health (Figure 1). For such
‘translations’, estimates of mortality or morbidity effects are
necessary; in many cases, such estimates will be available in the
published literature.
Choice of ex post assessment design
Limitations of randomized controlled trials
The organizations that fund and implement market interven-
tions also need to agree on how to measure effects.
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are commonly hailed as
the gold standard for evaluation. However, RCTs suffer from a
number of limitations, both in general (Deaton 2009) and in
the evaluation of ART market interventions in particular. First,
in the case of many types of market interventions, RCTs will be
impossible to conduct, because the interventions commonly
function through central mechanisms benefitting all market
actors equally, thus ruling out random assignment of actors to
intervention and control groups. For instance, the use of a
patent pool that allows companies in developing countries to
manufacture an antiretroviral drug generically before patent
expiration cannot be randomly assigned to some countries and
not to others.
Second, even if market interventions could theoretically be
assigned randomly, the very mechanisms by which these
interventions function will make it likely that market actors
will not accept the assignment and will attempt to circumvent
it. As the actors are likely to more vigorously attempt to
circumvent assignment the higher the pay-off from circumven-
tion, the deviations from assignment are likely to lead to biased
estimates of intervention effects (Deaton 2009). For example, if
a market intervention increases the quality of an antiretroviral
drug in an intervention country (e.g. by ensuring that coun-
terfeit drugs are screened out), consumers of the drug in a
control country may attempt to buy the drug from the
intervention country, and they are expected to do so more
vigorously the more they will gain from a better-quality product
(e.g. the more severely they suffer from HIV disease).
Third, random assignment may not be politically feasible, in
particular if an intervention is believed to be effective. For
instance, a training programme of provincial Ministry of Health
managers that aims to improve their capacity to negotiate ARV
prices may be perceived as beneficial before its effectiveness has
been established. The provincial managers may thus oppose a
randomized trial of the effectiveness of the training programme.
Fourth, RCTs have been criticized as tools to evaluate develop-
ment and global health interventions, because their findings are
often unlikely to be transferable to settings other than the trial
setting and they do not provide insights into the mechanism
leading to the effect (Biglan et al. 2000; Deaton 2009). Finally,
RCTs are usually more expensive than alternative evaluation
approaches. Thus, with few exceptions, RCTs are unlikely to
be either a feasible or meaningful approach to evaluate the
impact of interventions in antiretroviral markets on population
health.
Approaches to evaluate intervention impact based
on observational data
A range of evaluation methods has been developed in econo-
metrics and the evaluation sciences to infer causality from ob-
servational data. Table 1 provides an overview of a number of
commonly used methods to evaluate the effect of interven-
tions on outcomes (interrupted time series, regression discon-
tinuity, and difference-in-difference, matching, regression and
instrumental-variable approaches). The table also explains
limitations of each approach. Table 2 provides examples of
how these evaluation methods could be used to assess the
population health impact of market interventions.
Assessment issues
Unintended effects
Market interventions that are successful in achieving a par-
ticular intended outcome may have unintended effects that run
counter to the goal of improving population health. For
instance, interventions that successfully decrease the price of
paediatric ARV and consequently improve the health of
HIV-infected children may also reduce the incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to invest in the development of
new and better paediatric ARV, precluding potential future
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health gains. See Table 2 for further examples of unintended
intervention effects.
In both the ex ante and ex post assessment of the population
health impact of market interventions, researchers and organ-
izations funding or implementing market interventions need to
carefully consider possible unintended consequences. Economic
theory may offer guidance in ex ante assessment. For example,
based on economic theory we would expect limitations to
international patent protections of drugs for certain diseases to
lead to price reductions of existing drugs (Waning et al. 2010),
Table 1 Examples of methods for evaluating the effect of interventions on outcomes
Evaluation method Description Limitations
Interrupted time series (ITS) ITS uses the observed time trajectory of an outcome before
an intervention to forecast the future trajectory of the
outcome in the absence of the intervention. It is a time
series approach estimating the effect d in the following
equation
The evolution over time of the outcome before the
intervention may not be a good counterfactual
for how the outcome would have evolved had
the intervention not taken place.
Yt ¼ f ðTÞ þ Ttþ "t
where
Yt is the development of an outcome over time, represented
by function f ðTÞ, Tt is a variable indicating whether an
intervention is in effect in time period t, and "t is the
error term.
Regression discontinuity Intervention assignment is a discontinuous function of a
variable Zi. The effect of the intervention on the outcome
Yi can be estimated as d in the following equation
The extrapolation of data observed below the
threshold to values above the threshold may not
be a good counterfactual for how the outcome
would have evolved had the intervention not
taken place.
Yi ¼ f ðZiÞ þ Tiþ "i
where
Ti is 1 if Zi is above a certain threshold value (and the
intervention is thus in effect) and 0 if it is below the
threshold value (and the intervention is not in effect)
and "i is the error term.
Difference-in-difference Outcomes are observed for a group that receives the
intervention both in the period before and the period
after the intervention, and for a non-randomly assigned
control group during the same time periods. The effect of
the intervention can then be estimated as  in the
following equation
Difference-in-difference estimation assumes that
the outcome in the intervention and in the
control group follow the same trend over time.
If the outcome follows a different trend in the
two groups, the effect estimate will be biased.
It is also necessary for difference-in-difference
estimation to have identified a group unaffected
by the intervention (which may be difficult if
markets are connected) and to have measured
the outcome before the time of the intervention
in both the intervention and the control group
(which requires planning in advance of the
intervention implementation).
Yit ¼ þ 1Xi þ 2Tt þ XiTt þ "it
where Xi ¼ 1 if observation i belongs to the intervention
group and zero otherwise, Tt ¼ 1 in the period when
treatment occurs and zero otherwise, and "itis the error
term.
Matching Matching balances the distribution of observed variables in
those who receive the intervention and those who do
not, so that the difference in the observed outcome
between the two groups can be attributed solely to the
effect of the intervention.
Unobserved variables may affect the outcome,
leading to biased effect estimates.
Regression Regression can be used as an adjustment technique to
estimate the effect of an intervention on an outcome d,
controlling for common dependence of the intervention
and the outcome on other variables Xi. The effect d can
be estimated in the following equation
The set of control variables may not be sufficient
to achieve an unbiased estimate of the effect
of the intervention on the outcome (omitted
variable bias). If the outcome affects the
intervention (reverse causality), the effect
size estimate will be biased.
Yi ¼ þ Ti þ Xiþ "i
where Ti is the intervention variable, Xi represents other
variables,  is a vector of coefficients and "i is the error
term.
Instrumental variables If a variable exists that predicts the non-random
assignment or non-random intensity of an intervention,
but does not affect the outcome of interest (except by
way of the intervention), the association between this
instrumental variable and the intervention variable can
be used to estimate the causal effect of the intervention
on the outcome.
The hypothesis that a variable does not inde-
pendently affect the outcome cannot be tested
and is often hard to defend. If the instrumental
variable is only weakly associated with the
intervention variable, effect estimation can
be severely biased. It is also necessary for
instrumental-variable estimation to have identified
a group unaffected by the intervention, which
is difficult in interconnected markets.
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but also to reduce investment in the development of new drugs
for the same diseases (Ngue´s 1993; Reichman 2009; Hemphill
2010; Honig and Lalonde 2010). In contrast, interventions that
reduce the fixed costs of supplier entry into the market for
drugs for a particular disease may lower the price of some
drugs, without reducing the economic incentives to invest in
the development of new drugs for the same disease.
If, despite potential unintended consequences, a market inter-
vention is implemented, the plans for ex post assessment should
include data collection to ensure that analyses can determine
the extent to which such effects will indeed have occurred.
Many of the unintended consequences may be more difficult to
observe directly or to measure, because they are medium- to long-
run effects. For example, measuring decreased investment in new
treatments as a response to a market intervention generally
requires verifiable information from firms or a sufficiently long
lag to observe the outcomes of such investment.
Interaction effects
It is possible that different ARV market interventions interact in
affecting markets and population health. For instance, inter-
ventions reducing ARV prices in certain countries may not
improve population health because information on increases in
demand following a price reduction is not transmitted success-
fully through ARV supply chains. It is unlikely that organiza-
tions implementing one or a few market interventions can
adequately predict or evaluate all possible intervention inter-
actions. Organizations funding market interventions, on the
other hand, are well positioned to consider how different market
interventions enhance or impede each other’s effects. These
organizations should thus invest in forecasting interaction
effects in ex ante assessment, and ensure that such effects are
adequately taken into account in ex post analysis. In these
assessments, it should also be considered in how far some of
the unintended effects of one intervention can be mitigated by
other interventions. For instance, worries about the effect
of ARV price-reducing interventions on investment in ARV
development may be lessened if innovative financing
mechanisms are simultaneously put into place that increase
funding flows for ART research and development (Hecht et al.
2009b).
Time horizons of assessment
In many situations, we would expect different effects of market
interventions to play out at different times relative to the
implementation of the intervention. Price reductions may be
Table 2 Examples of approaches to evaluate the population health impact of ART market interventions
Market intervention Mechanism for intended and unintended effects Example evaluation approach
Pooled procurement of antiretroviral
medicines across several antiretroviral
treatment programmes
Intended effect: Increased market power on the demand
side, reducing the price of the antiretroviral drug and
thus the quantity demanded (market effect), which
increases coverage (health system effect) and decreases
mortality in HIV-infected people.
Difference-in-difference analysis
comparing population health
outcomes before and after the
start of pooled procurement in
geographical areas with
programmes participating in this
intervention to areas without
participating programmes.
Potential unintended effect: Increased market power on the
demand side may lead to consolidation of suppliers,
increasing the risk of collusion and price increases.
Financial support for the development of
a ‘Mother and Baby Pack’ to increase
access to prevention of mother-to-child
transmission of HIV (PMTCT)
Intended effect: The financial support leads to the
development of a locally appropriate ‘Mother and Baby
Pack’ and increases PMTCT coverage.
Interrupted time series analysis of
HIV-related child mortality.
Potential unintended effect: The initial success of the pack
decreases the incentives for governments to invest in
systems for PMTCT, leading to worse population health
outcomes, as new and improved PMTCT technologies
become available that cannot be delivered as a pack.
Financing ready-to-use therapeutic foods
(RUTF) for paediatric ART patients
Intended effects: Financing of RUTF increases the quantity
of RUTF consumed (market effect), which in turn
improves the overall effect of paediatric ART (health
system effect), improving morbidity and mortality in
children on ART.
Use of random shocks to the
RUTF supply chain (e.g. rainfall
impeding transport) as an
instrumental variable to estimate
the effect of RUTF on health
outcomes in children on ART.
Potential unintended effects: Supply of internationally
produced RUTF through donor funding may reduce
the incentives to develop locally appropriate products
and crowd out local industry producing RUTF.
Training of district health managers in
supply chain management in those dis-
tricts in a country that fall below a
certain poverty threshold (i.e. the most
vulnerable ones)
Intended effects: Improved supply chain management skills
lead to improved delivery of antiretroviral drugs to
patients (market effect), increasing the effectiveness
of treatment (health system effect) and decreasing
morbidity and mortality in patients on ART.
Regression discontinuity analysis of
mortality of ART patients as a
function of the district poverty
level.
Potential unintended effects: Improved skills of district health
managers may improve their value to pharmaceutical
companies who increasingly hire them, leaving public
health systems depleted of management skills.
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observable in the short run following an intervention, while
effects on investment decisions may only become observ-
able after a considerable lag time. In assessing intervention
impact ex post, researchers thus need to decide on the appro-
priate time horizon for evaluation. In presenting the results of
short-run evaluations, studies need to emphasize that certain
longer-run effects may not yet have become observable; and in
order to consider evidence on intervention effects as conclusive,
in many cases evaluation of long-run outcomes may be
necessary.
The fact that some intervention effects only occur in the long
run, however, does not eliminate the need for short-term as-
sessments of intervention effects. First, the funding cycles of
organizations investing in market interventions may require as-
sessments of interventions results before some long-run effects
will have manifested themselves. Second, if an intervention
produces undesirable outcomes in the short run, funding or
implementing organizations may decide to change or stop it,
independent of long-term results. For instance, if an interven-
tion that was expected to increase ART coverage in the short
run is found instead to reduce coverage, the organizations fund-
ing and implementing the intervention may decide to stop it,
independent of any potential long-run impact on population
health. Third, while the scope of intervention outcomes that
can be observed expands with increasing time horizon of ob-
servation, attribution of causal relationships between outcome
and intervention becomes increasingly difficult. Thus, short-run
assessments of market intervention impacts should usually be
required.
Impartiality of assessment
While it seems appropriate to ask organizations applying for
funding to implement market interventions to forecast the mar-
ket effects and population health impacts of the intervention in
ex ante assessment, ex post assessment of intervention success
may only be considered impartial if the assessor is independent
from the implementing organization. Moreover, while the data
an assessor uses may only be available within the implementing
organization, it will be essential for credible evaluation results
that these data can be easily verified, for instance, by inde-
pendent auditors. In planning interventions in ARV markets,
funding agencies should thus discuss with implementing organ-
izations which data should be collected for evaluation and how
the data should be collected. For instance, for data on ART
coverage anonymized extractions of clinic records may be re-
quired; and data on ART supply chain interventions may need
to be collected and verified with independent audits in the
organizations that receive the products transported through the
supply chain.
Costs of assessment
Assessment, both ex ante and ex post, is costly. Data on inter-
vention implementation and outcomes need to be collected,
entered, checked and analysed. The results of the analyses need
to be interpreted and presented. We would expect the costs of
ex ante assessment to decrease with the level of previous
knowledge about the population health impact of an interven-
tion and to increase with the complexity of models needed to
adequately forecast intervention impact. The costs of ex post
assessments will depend on the:
 Extent to which data on intervention impact are collected
through routine systems (such as market reporting mech-
anisms or vital registration systems) or need to be collected
specifically for the assessment;
 Assessment design (such as controlled trials vs observations
studies);
 Time horizon of the assessment;
 Assessment frequency.
Funders of market interventions need to decide how much
money they are willing to invest in intervention assessment.
While these costs would normally constitute only a small pro-
portion of total intervention costs, in certain cases very costly
assessments may be justified. High costs of an ex post assess-
ment (for instance, for a RCT) may be justified if a market
intervention has never been evaluated in terms of its efficacy in
improving population health. In contrast, once intervention
efficacy has been established in one particular case, it may no
longer be necessary to invest in costly efficacy evaluation; rather
it may suffice to evaluate the effect of the intervention on
health systems, such as changes in coverage with ART. Funders
should also consider the potential synergies in pooling assess-
ment resources across implementing organizations. Such
synergies could arise in the joint use of analysts and in pooling
data on the same type of intervention across organizations in
order to increase the power of studies in detecting significant
effects on markets and population health.
Discussion
International organizations intervening in markets to improve
population health need to assess the potential impact of their
actions before implementation, monitor impact during imple-
mentation and document the effects after implementation.
Assessments are needed at all stages to select the most pro-
mising interventions, continue effective interventions, discon-
tinue ineffective ones and demonstrate to stakeholders and the
public that interventions fulfill their function. Market inter-
ventions pose a number of specific evaluation challenges. For
one, they are relatively far removed from their final goals,
working their way to health impact through effects on markets
and health systems. Moreover, markets are dynamic in nature,
and numerous factors other than the intervention affect
market and health outcomes. Finally, in most cases it will
be impossible to evaluate market interventions in an RCT,
because randomization will not be feasible for technical,
political or ethical reasons.
The assessment of health impact ex ante should always include
a due-diligence evaluation of the safety and efficacy of a product
whose market will be affected by the intervention, and a
description of the hypothesized mechanisms via which the inter-
vention will impact population health. Quantitative assessment
of intervention impact can only be obtained through predictive
modelling. For interventions that have precedents that were
rigorously evaluated, it may be appropriate to request from
applicants quantitative predictions of population health impact.
For interventions that have never been implemented, on the
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other hand, quantitative prediction of population health impact
may not be possible with any useful degree of precision.
In this context, it is important to note that while we have
maintained the distinction between ex ante assessment (i.e.
before a market intervention has been implemented) and ex post
assessment (i.e. after the intervention has been implemented)
throughout the paper, in reality this distinction will often not
be clear-cut. A first reason is that the relationship between the
decision to implement an intervention, the actual implementa-
tion and assessment of intervention outcomes is not linear
but cyclical, as ex post assessment of an intervention will feed
into ex ante assessment to support the decision on whether an
intervention should be continued in its current form, continued
with adjustments, or discontinued. A second reason is that even
if one particular intervention has never been implemented,
making any ex post assessment impossible, related interventions
may have been implemented, whose ex post assessment could
be used in the ex ante assessment of the novel intervention.
Related interventions comprise interventions that differ to some
extent in content (e.g. a different approach to train health
workers in supply chain management), context (e.g. imple-
mentation in a different country), or scale (e.g. a previous
pilot study) from the novel intervention. A third reason is that
two interventions can never be the precisely the same if they
are implemented during different time periods, because the
social, economic and political contexts change over time.
As such, evidence from past interventions can never be thought
to perfectly predict future intervention success and in
ex ante assessments we will always need to consider the
applicability of ex post assessments, even if the past interven-
tions do not differ from the future ones in content, geographic
reach, or scale.
These caveats on the distinction between ex ante and ex post
intervention are important to keep in mind, when considering
our recommendations below. Furthermore, while we focus our
recommendations on the evaluation of market interventions,
some may be applicable to other types of interventions, such as
interventions in health systems and services.
Recommendation 1: The decision makers selecting market interventions
for funding should routinely require applicants to provide:
 Descriptions of hypothesized causal mechanisms leading from
intervention to health impact;
 Assessment of the quality of the evidence that the intervention will
achieve its intended effect;
 Assessment of the risk that an intervention will lead to unintended
consequences.
For some types of interventions, it may be appropriate to demand that
applicants provide a quantitative prediction of population health
impact.
For ex post assessment of population health impact, stake-
holders need to take several decisions. First, they need to decide
at which point along the causal chain from intervention to
health impact to observe outcomes. Second, they need to decide
which evaluation approach to use in analysing the observed
data. In general, it will be easier to measure market and health
system variables than health outcomes, because the former are
commonly collected routinely and are available in central
databases, while the latter will often require additional data
collection. In addition, it will often be easier to attribute changes
in market and health system outcomes to an intervention
compared with changes in health outcomes, because the former
will depend less on other intervening variables and will react more
immediately to the intervention than the latter. Measuring only
market or health system outcomes, however, implies that
causal analyses will be confined to the pathway from interven-
tion to these effects, whereas the impact on health needs to be
estimated in predictive models. Those models are necessarily
based on a range of uncertain assumptions, including estimates
of intervention health effects. Model-derived results may thus
be less convincing to stakeholders and more difficult to publish
than effect estimates based directly on observed population
health outcomes.
Recommendation 2: Applicants should be required to demonstrate how
their intervention could be assessed during and after the intervention.
Given the trade-offs involved in the decision on which outcomes to
measure and which to model, it is important that all stakeholders agree
on an evaluation design before the start of the intervention.
Different evaluation approaches have different data needs.
For instance, interrupted time series analysis of the effect of
market interventions on health systems outcomes may be
possible with aggregated data (e.g. by district) and with limited
information on variables other than the outcome and the
timing of the intervention. In contrast, estimation of effect size
based on matching will require data at the level of the unit at
which the intervention is assigned. Moreover, matching esti-
mation will in general perform better when more variables are
available on which to match. Difference-in-difference estima-
tion necessarily requires measurement of baseline values before
the start of the intervention, while regression discontinuity
analysis can be conducted when only data from periods after
intervention start are available. Instrumental variable estima-
tion will commonly require collection of data on variables that
are not routinely available in health systems and ART
programmes, such as data on weather conditions, geographical
distance between market actors, or a country’s cultural history.
Data that do not arise in the organizations implementing
an intervention should be collected by independent entities,
such as consultancy companies hired by funders or academic
research teams. Data that can only be collected within the
organizations implementing an intervention need to be inde-
pendently verified to ensure that the data are not distorted to
meet criteria of intervention success.
Recommendation 3: Given the varying data collection needs of different
evaluation approaches and the need to collect baseline data in the case
of some approaches, it is crucial that monitoring and evaluation are
built into the intervention from the beginning. To ensure that
assessment results are credible, data used in the assessment need to be
independently verifiable and the assessment itself should be conducted
by individuals or organizations that are independent from the
organizations funding or implementing the intervention.
It is important to distinguish between monitoring and ex post
evaluation. In this article, we discuss approaches to evaluate the
impact of ART market interventions to establish as far as
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possible the causal effect of the intervention on population
health outcomes. Such evaluation serves the purpose of improv-
ing our understanding of the functioning of market inter-
ventions and legitimizes future decisions on the continuation
of interventions. Monitoring, on the other hand, serves man-
agerial purposes, ensuring that the intervention is implemented
as intended, that intervention resources are used correctly
and without waste, and that unintended intervention effects
are quickly detected. Unlike evaluation, which is undertaken
at certain discrete time points after the start of an interven-
tion, monitoring is an ongoing exercise, which needs to
continue even if the effectiveness of an intervention has been
proven.
Recommendation 4: Stakeholders need to decide when to evaluate the
effect of an ART market intervention. Separately from an ex post
assessment plan, they need to agree on a monitoring approach—ex post
assessment cannot fulfill the managerial functions of monitoring.
Evaluation is a costly exercise. It may require specific data
collection, data input and quality control, as well as analysts’
time to compute estimates of intervention effect size and
significance. On the one hand, it may thus seem wasteful to
repeat evaluating an intervention, after its causal effect on
population health has been firmly established. However, it is
possible that effectiveness is a function of intervention stage
(e.g. if patients utilizing a new ART product immediately after
market introduction differ systematically from patients utilizing
the product at later points in time), intervention scale (e.g. if
intervention resources are used more efficiently the more
people the intervention reaches), or secular trends (e.g. if the
structure of companies producing ART products changes over
time).
While both ex ante and ex post assessments of the population
health impact of market interventions are important, the costs
of assessment should be reasonable in comparison to the costs
of intervention implementation. Funders of market interven-
tions should devise strategic long-term plans for intervention
assessment including explicit considerations of assessment
costs. It may be possible to reduce the costs of assessment by
pooling assessment resources across organizations.
Recommendation 5: Decision makers need to assess the added value of
repeating ex post assessments at later stages of an intervention. The
decision will likely depend on theoretical considerations of how far
intervention effects could differ when assessed at a different point in
time.
Recommendation 6: The costs of assessment need to be appropriate.
Organizations implementing individual interventions may not
be aware of all potential unintended effects of an intervention,
and they may not have knowledge of interventions imple-
mented by other organizations. Funders of market interventions
should thus invest in background documents and guidelines on
unintended effects of interventions. Such documents can serve
as a starting point for evaluating these types of effects in
assessments of the population health impact of market inter-
ventions. Moreover, they should systematically collect informa-
tion on the activities of other funders to avoid duplication,
facilitate collaboration and allow evaluation of interventions
across funding institutions.
Recommendation 7: Assessors need to investigate unintended effects of
interventions and interaction effects between different interventions.
Such assessments should be systematically supported by funders of
market interventions.
In sum, both ex ante and ex post assessments of the population
health impact of intervening in ART markets require careful
planning. Stakeholders need to decide which impacts to assess,
what data to collect, which analytical approaches to use, and
when and how often to evaluate impact. These decisions will
depend on the type of intervention, stakeholders’ expectations
of the strength of the evidence and the impartiality of the
assessor, data availability, limitations of existing analytic
methods and the cost of assessment.
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